Download Free PDF. The Eye of the Storm Mudasar Jehan. A short summary of this paper. Download Download PDF.
Translate PDF. Copyright Law and except by reviewers for the public press , without written permission from the publishers. For information about this and other Yale University Press publications, please contact: U. Office: sales. Includes bibliographical references and index. Mohammed Ali Jinnah. Mujibur Rahman. Dacca beating. Ayub Khan. Yayha Khan. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Zia ul Haq. Nawaz Sharif. Benazir Bhutto. Celebrating nuclear tests.
A Ghauri missile. Pervez Musharraf. Karachi violence. Soldiers pray during the Kargil conflict. Line of control, Kashmir. Jaish placard. Islamic demonstration. Most Pakistanis, from policemen to politicians, shopkeepers to soldiers, love to talk about pol- itics.
Admittedly, the more they know the less willing they are to speak on the record but nevertheless Pakistan remains a very open country. Countries such as Saudi Arabia manage to avoid hostile media coverage simply by refusing to grant journalists sufficient access to do their work.
My first thanks, then, are to the many Pakistanis who were so will- ing to share their views with a foreign visitor. For over a decade now, he has had the unenvi- able task of explaining the finer points of Pakistani politics to succes- sive BBC correspondents sent from London.
Beyond expressing my thanks, all I can say is that I look forward, one day, to reading a book written by him. Akbar Zaidi. Jaleel Akhtar did a tremendous job in responding to my ceaseless requests for books, figures and various documents. Last, but by no means least, thanks to my wife Amanda for her sup- port throughout the time I was writing this book. An editor by profes- sion, she not only improved the text but also ensured I had the time necessary to complete the task.
The country has been under military rule for nearly half its existence. No elected government has ever completed its term in office. It has had three wars with India and has lost around half of its territory. Its economy has never flourished.
Religious extremists have been given free reign. Yet those fears are genuine. The Kashmir dispute has helped Indo-Pakistani hostility to thrive.
But there have also been other factors at play. Immediately after inde- pendence many Indian leaders made no secret of their hope that Pakistan would collapse and that the subcontinent would consequently be reunited. When Pakistan came into being it was composed of two geographically separate entities, East and West Pakistan, which lay a thousand miles apart.
Events fully justified his pessimism. The Indian leader wanted to show the Pakistani people that Delhi fully accepted their right to live in a separate country. After all, many Pakistanis pointed out, just nine months earlier it was the very same Vajpayee who ordered Indian scientists to conduct nuclear tests.
Because of its sense of vulnerability, Pakistan has always been on the look-out for big-power friends. When, during the cold war, Delhi tilted towards Moscow, Islamabad was quick to see its chance. Twenty years later, another military ruler, General Zia ul Haq, adopted a similar approach.
After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan he ensured that Pakistan became a frontline state in the bat- tle against communism. Eqbal Ahmed, used to liken the relationship between the United States and Pakistan to that of an errant husband and his mis- tress.
When in the mood, the United States would overwhelm Pakistan with loving attention and generous gifts. But the tempestuous relation- ship was never steady. Many Pakistanis consider the US to have been a disloyal, inconstant friend.
He will almost certainly be disappointed. While this message has resonated neatly with Western anti-Islamic prejudices, I shall argue in this book that such a depiction of Pakistan is unfair.
This is not to deny the indisputable fact that successive Pakistani governments have given a remarkable amount of leeway to Islamic extremists. It is an appalling fact, to give just one example, that in recent years Islamic militants have been able to tour Pak- istani mosques displaying the heads of Indian security personnel killed in Kashmir.
But deeper factors have also been at play. Ever since its creation, Pakistan has grappled with the issue of what role Islam should play in the state. When he called for the establishment of Pakistan, Mohammed Ali Jinnah advanced the two-nation theory. Muslims and Hindus, he argued, constituted two nations that could never live together. A strict interpretation of the two-nation theory has led some Pakistanis to conclude that the country was always intended to be an Islamic state.
But others — and in my opinion the majority — have a different view. They believe that Jinnah was trying to create a country in which Muslims could live in safety, free from Hindu domi- nance. Most Pakistanis do not want to live in a theocracy: they want their country to be moderate, modern, tolerant and stable. The militant groups remain well-organised, well-armed and well-financed. His attempt to downplay the role of religion in the state directly challenges the interests of well-entrenched and highly motivated elements of Pakistani society.
His success or fail- ure — the likelihood of which are discussed in the final chapter — will have far reaching implications not only for Pakistan but also the region and the international security system as a whole. The Kashmir dispute, the relationships with India and the United States and the need to define the role of Islam are only some of the issues that confront Pakistan today. There are many other serious challenges. In some out- lying rural areas, where feudal landlords rule like kings, many people feel greater loyalty to their province than they do to Pakistan.
The very high levels of corruption have led many Pakista- nis to become deeply disillusioned with their ruling elite. Countless newspaper articles have been written on these issues. But for those who want to acquire a deeper understanding of Pakistan there are only a handful of books to consult. Two of them are by journalists. But both were pub- lished over a decade ago and are inevitably somewhat out of date. More recently, two Western academics have written histories of Pakistan.
Although I spent two and half years as a journalist travelling around Pakistan, this is not a journalistic memoir. It is a history of Pakistan. By avoiding political science jargon and a theoretical approach I have tried to bridge the gap between the academic histories of Ziring and Talbot and the journalistic accounts of Duncan and Lamb. Unlike Ziring and Talbot I have not dealt with the subject matter chronologically. Pakistan faces many critical issues which lend themselves neatly to a thematic approach.
I hope that readers who want to know about a particular issue, for example, Kashmir or the nuclear programme will find this arrangement convenient. Any Western, and in particular British, author writing about Pakistan is undertaking a hazardous exercise. With considerable justification many Pakistanis resent the way they have been portrayed by outsiders.
I can only hope that those Pakistanis who read this book will think it provides a less biased picture of their country than is generally put for- ward. I should perhaps add that I have always had relatively limited ambitions for this book.
The real target for this book is non-Pakistanis who want to understand more about an important and underrated country. Names can be, and often are, spelt in several different ways. I have opted for the spelling preferred by the person being referred to with one exception.
I have not, however, standardised the spelling where it refers to an author of a printed book mentioned in my text or listed in the bibliography. The word Baloch refers to the people, Balochi to the language. In line with official usage in contemporary Pakistan I shall use Baloch and Balochi rather than the British imperial versions Baluch and Baluchi. Pathan, Pushtoon or Pukhtoon? I favour Pukhtoon on the grounds that it is closer to local pronunciation in North West Frontier Province.
Similarly, Pukhto for the language. In line with contemporary usage in Pakistan I refer to the dreamt-of Pukhtoon homeland as Pukhtoonkwa throughout the text. All other place names are according to the Times Atlas of the World. In cases where I quote extracts from passages of text I have kept to the original spelling. They are poised to create dissensions and damage the country. There is no reason why this minority should be allowed to hold the sane majority as a hostage.
Not even the 0. And then a third plane was seen approaching Washington. It took just a few hours for the US administration to conclude that the attacks had probably originated from Afghanistan and that any effective counter-attack would require the co-operation of Pakistan. With her was Lt. Mehmood had just completed an official visit to Washington but his return to Pakistan had been delayed because, following the attacks, all the airspace around New York had been closed.
Lodhi and Mehmood were asked to attend a meeting with senior US officials the next morning. Islamabad could align itself with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan or with Washington. He told Mehmood that Washington would get what it wanted. Armitage held a second meeting with Lodhi and Mehmood. He is prepared to embrace them, if not unconditionally, then at least without encumbering hinself with any twinges of nostalgia for the past's redundant credos and repertories.
The essays which make up this collection - on subjects as various as postmodernism and pop music, AIDS and art movies, Tintin and the Titanic - thus constitute a uniquely stimulating record of the nineties and, like the cool, glinting surfaces of a Calder mobile, reflect the most significant fragments of our cultural agenda.
This is the book for you. Kelly Erickson, author of Maximum Customer Experience Most people know that branding is the most effective marketing strategy to build a long-term relationship with a dedicated group of customers.
But many of us forget about the zeitgeist. The zeitgeist is the evolving collective consciousness of society, and it is what people are talking about.
It's what determines trends and buying behaviors. Companies can tap into the power of the zeitgeist by providing customers with the tools they need to spread marketing messages through word-of-mouth and other viral channels. Duraiz Mahmud. Thomas Johnson. A short summary of this paper.
Johnson and M. Chris Mason Thomas H. Johnson thjohnso nps. Chris Mason is a retired foreign service officer and presently a senior fellow at the Center for Advanced Defense Studies in Washington, D. The authors thank Dr. Abstract: Afghanistan is in danger of capsizing in a perfect storm of insur- gency that mimics operations and tactics witnessed in Iraq. This article assesses this insurgency and the re-emergent Taliban. The common view of the Taliban as simply a radical Afghan Islamist movement is overly simple, for that organization has been able to build on tribal kinship networks and a charis- matic mullah phenomenon to mobilize a critical and dynamic rural base of support.
As demon- strated by the deadly anti-American riots in the capital in May , political volatility is even starting to reach urban areas. With the U. Currently, the best strategy would be focused coordination of a dramatically increased Provincial Recon- struction Team PRT presence and massive economic development. That is the best way of winning against the Taliban, which for now has good chances of returning. We attempt here to shed new light on the idea of the Taliban.
Behind all actions lie ideas, and the current Western perception of the Taliban, both in academia and in policy circles, centers on the belief that the Taliban are primarily an obtuse, radical Islamist organization. The Islamist element of the Taliban may be simply that—an element of the complex historical and tribal phenomenon of the Pashtuns—but this article assesses other aspects of the Taliban, such as its tribal dynamics and charisma.
We then analyze the effects of the current insurgency from the strategic and operational levels and examine its implications for U. We assume that the insurgency stems from three fundamental problems: 1 the lack of state formation and the inability of the national government to establish a significant presence throughout the country, 2 the failure to make the rural areas secure so that development and reconstruction can proceed, and 3 the lack of any meaningful improvement in the lives of the great majority of the people in the southern half of the country.
Following the Soviet withdrawal in , Afghanistan deteriorated into a brutal civil war between rival mujahideen groups, many of which had spent much of their energy fighting each other even during the height of the anti-Soviet jihad.
The civil war intensified after a mujahideen group took Kabul in April This civil war, fought with the vast surplus ordnance of the covert anti-Soviet military aid program and huge stockpiles of abandoned Soviet weapons, eventually wreaked as much if not more damage and destruction on the country than the Soviet invasion and occupation.
Kabul, which was left virtually untouched under Soviet occupation, was savagely bombarded with rockets, mortars, and artillery by Hekmatyar. In Kandahar, fighting between Islamists and traditionalist mujahideen parties resulted in the destruction of much of the traditional power structures. In the rural areas, warlords, drug lords, and bandits ran amok in a state of anarchy created by the unraveling of the traditional tribal leadership system.
As the mujahideen factions and warlords were fighting each other for power, Saudi Arabia invested heavily in the region, most notably funding madrassas religious boarding schools in Pakistan that sought to spread the conservative Wahhabi version of Islam practiced in the Saudi kingdom. These madrassas would come to serve as an important educational alternative for the numerous displaced refugees from the anti-Soviet jihad and Afghan civil war as well as for poor families along the frontier who could not afford the secular schools.
In Afghanistan, the Taliban recruited primarily from madrassas near Ghazni and Kandahar. It arrived on the Afghan scene in with little warning and vowed to install a traditional Islamic government and end the fighting among the mujahideen. The Taliban considered this regime responsible for a continuing civil war and the deterioration of security in country, as well as discrimination against Pashtuns.
Afghanistan soon became a training ground for Islamic activists and other radicals from the Middle East and around Asia. War-weary Afghans initially welcomed the Taliban, which promoted itself as a new force for honesty and unity and was seen as the desperately needed balm of peace and stability by many Afghans, particularly fellow Pashtuns. The Taliban immediately targeted warlords who were deemed responsible for much of the destruction, instability, and chaos that plagued the country since the outbreak of the civil war.
But it also instituted a religious police force, the Amr Bil Marof Wa Nai An Munkir Promotion of Virtue and Suppression of Vice to brutally uphold its extreme and often unorthodox interpretations of Islam, which were not previously known in Afghanistan. Taliban philosophy, Ahmed Rashid notes,. The Taliban represented nobody but themselves and they recognized no Islam except their own. Before the Taliban, Islamic extremism had never flourished in Afghanistan.
Characteristics of the Taliban The Taliban primarily consists of rural Pashtuns from the Ghilzai confederation with some support from the Kakar tribe of the Ghurghusht confederation.
The roots of the Taliban are found in the mujahideen effort against the Soviets. From the hundreds of resistance groups that sprang up, the ISID recognized seven and established offices for them through which to channel covert support. Although most had a strong religious ethos, the groups were organized primarily along ethnic and tribal lines.
Significantly, three of the seven were led by Ghilzais and none by their rivals, the Durranis, who were deliberately marginalized by the 5 ISID.
The importance of these ethnic roots of the Taliban in the mujahideen movement cannot be overstated. Yet its tribal heritage is only a partial explana- tion of what the Taliban represents. Similarly, there were important seminaries in Peshawar, Akora Khattack, and Quetta, which all played a pivotal role in building up the Taliban movement.
While Deobandi madrassas have flourished across South Asia, they were not offi- cially supported or sanctioned in Pakistan until President Zia ul Haq assumed control of the Pakistani government in The mullah's storm Item Preview. EMBED for wordpress. Want more? Advanced embedding details, examples, and help!
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When their plane is shot down in a blizzard while transporting an important Taliban detainee, navigator Michael Parson and Army interpreter Sergeant Gold fight for survival in the harsh terrain of Afghanistan, where they struggle to outmaneuver terrorists and dubiously trustworthy villagers.
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